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1. Introduction
One prominent goal of discourse analysis is to uncover the conceptual
structures denoted by a discourse. For many studies of discourse structure
(Polanyi 1988, Mann & Thompson 1988, Sanders & Van Wijk 1996),
analytical practice includes a characterization of the coherence structure of
discourse, that is, the way in which the basic discourse units are connected
to each other.1 The notion coherence structure refers to connectedness of
discourse that sets it apart from random sets of sentences. If discourse
analysis is employed äs a method for investigating cognitive processes in
1
 In this paper, we will confine ourselves to the analysis of monological, written
discourse, i.e. texts.
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reading and producing discourse, the coherence structure may reveal
significant insights in the way people maintain or build a cognitive
representation of texts (Van der Pool 1995, Sanders, Janssen, van der
Pool, Schilperoord & van Wijk 1996, Sanders & Schilperoord to appear,
Schilperoord 1996). However, a prerequisite for the analysis of discourse
coherence is that the basic elements, or discourse segments, between
which coherence relations hold, are identified by the analyst. An
important question, then, becomes how one should proceed in dividing
discourse into discourse segments. If, for example, a Claim-Argument
relation is said to hold between two segments A and B, such that A
expresses a claim and B an argument favouring that claim, then prior to
this analysis and according to some criterion, A and B must have been
labelled äs 'discourse segments'. Such a criterion should meet various
conditions. Apart from being feasible, it should properly identify the basic
building blocks constituting a discourse. In addition, the criterion should
be unbiased towards the theory of coherence relations underlying the
analysis of discourse structure. Mann & Thompson (1988) have been
particularly explicit on this matter: '(...) the division of the text into units
should be based on some theory-neutral classification.'
The importance of this demand can be put into perspective by
considering one outstanding definition of a coherence relation äs an aspect
of meaning of two or more discourse segments which cannot be described
in terms ofthe meaning ofthe segments in Isolation (Sanders, Spooren &
Noordman 1992). This definition first of all presupposes a possibility to
identify the 'segments in isolation'. Moreover, its validity crucially hinges
on the availability of a procedure which does not already include this
'aspect of meaning' that cannot be described in terms of the isolated
segments. For this reason, Mann and Thompson (and also Sanders & Van
Wijk 1996) propose to employ a criterion based on the syntactic properties
of sentences (the so-called clause criterion, to be discussed in more detail
later on). In brief, they propose treating grammatical clauses äs the basic
discourse segments. Since clauses can, at least in theory, be identified on
the basis of their structural properties, this criterion avoids inclusion of
the meaning of segments, and the meaning of the relations holding
between them, in identifying discourse segments. Mann and Thompson
themselves have acknowledged that the criterion cannot be applied in a
simple and straightforward manner. However, the exceptions they have
therefore introduced are not, äs we shall see, fully adequate and they
furthermore lack explanatory import. It is these two problems that we
want to address simultaneously in this paper.
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Our first objective in this paper is to argue that a purely syntactic
criterion sometimes makes predictions äs to the segmentation of discourse
that are counter-intuitive, and that where is does make plausible
predictions it fails to account for this plausibility. Subsequently, we will
show that a procedure for properly segmenting discourse should take into
account the conceptual relations between clauses. We therefore introduce a
notion of conceptual dependency between clauses, and show that where it
holds between two clauses, these clauses cannot enter into a discourse-
level coherence relation with each other. We propose a procedure for
segmentation that takes this very notion äs its point of departure, and we
will show that it results in the right kind of segmentation, where the
strictly syntactic procedure fails to do so. Section 2 highlights Mann &
Thompson's proposal, and demonstrates a number of problematic cases of
segmentation. Section 3 introduces and exemplifies the notion of
conceptual dependency. The procedure that is based upon this notion is
exemplified for several types of clauses. Section 4 works out some
consequences of our proposal by relating it to the notion of 'elaboration
sites', introduced by Langacker (1987).
2. Formally determined discourse segments
The clause criterion äs it is applied by Mann and Thompson and by
Sanders & van Wijk can be summarized äs follows (see 1).
(1) i. Each clause is a segment, and a clause is a structure
headed by a finite of infinite verb
ii. Exceptions to i are:
a. restrictive relative clauses
b. clausal subjects
c. clausal complements
iii. In cases of contracted coordinate clauses, the second
conjunct is a segment provided only one major
constituent is contracted.2
Now, consider a sentence like (2).
(2) Because John refuses to eat he is visibly getting thinner
2
 We will ignore clause-complexes containing coordinate clauses in this paper.
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There are two finite verbs, hence two clauses, in this sentence. The
exceptions mentioned in rules ii and iii do not apply, so that the clause
criterion splits the sentence into two Segments: 'Because John refuses to
eat' (= A) and 'he is visibly getting thinner'. The two segments in
Isolation can thus be identified äs John refuses to eat and he is visibly
getting thinner. The aspect of meaning that is not describable in terms of
these segments is the causal relation between them, which, in the present
case, is marked explicitly by the connector because, The coherence
structure of (2) therefore is something like 'BECAUSE (segment a, segment
b)'. The fact that because marks one segment äs expressing a cause and the
other äs expressing a consequence cannot be derived from the meanings of
segment a and b, for in Isolation they simply designate two events. To
sum up, for sentence (2) the clause criterion leads to a plausible analysis -
the discourse segments are identified on the basis of their grammatical
structure, and the coherence relation holding between them can be
analyzed independently from the two segments. The causality relation is
therefore situated on the level of discourse. Note that, in principle, it is
not crucial for the causality relation to hold whether or not an explicit
causality marker is present, or, if it is, what this marker is (cf. 'John
refuses to eat; he is visibly getting thinner'). Sometimes the conjunction
and, or punctuation, may suffice to allow the reader to construct the
appropriate coherence relation between the two clauses/segments. In
addition, the location of the coherence marker is of no relevance here
either - compare for example 'John refuses to eat and therefore he is
visibly getting thinner'.
However, there are some serious problems with the clause criterion. One
of these shows up when we consider rule ii in (1). As this rule points out,
several types of clauses are excluded from the set of possible discourse
segments, namely restrictive relative clauses and complement clauses.3
Granting for the moment the definition of coherence relations, this implies
that such clauses cannot enter into a coherence relation with another clause
in the discourse. Therefore, the connections they entertain with their
respective matrix structures cannot be located on the level of discourse but
have to be located on the level of grammatical structure. The clause
criterion thus makes a distinction between two types of clauses in terms of
their ability to enter into a coherence relation (cf. Mann & Thompson
1988:248; Sanders 1992:115). This distinction is quite fundamental, but
We take clausal subjects to be a type of complement clauses (cf. below).
CONCEPTUAL DEPENDENCY AND THE CLAUSAL STRUCTURE OF DISCOURSE /145
no motivation whatsoever is provided. Relative clauses and complement
clauses are only listed äs exceptions on rule i, without there being
provided a proper (linguistic) justification for this exceptional Status.
Another, related problem emerges in actual analytic practise. Consider (3),
taken from a large corpus of Dutch formal judicial letters.4
(3) Daarbij körnt // dat zijn vrouw ernstig gehandicapt is // en dat hij
een gezin heeft te onderhouden.
(Thereby comes // that bis wife severely disabled is // and that he a
family has to take care of.)
Ίο this it can be added that his wife is severely disabled and that he
has to take care of his family.
Sentence (3) presents a highly frequent sentence types in the corpus.
Especially the specific argumentative use of the verb 'körnen' in 'Daarbij
körnt' ('To this it can be added') is highly frequent in Dutch formal prose.
As to its partitioning, (3) consists of a main clause Daarbij körnt, and two
coordinated complement clauses dat zijn vrouw ernstig gehandicapt is
('that his wife is severely disabled') and dat hij een gezin heeft te
onderhouden ('that he has a family to take care of). Slashes indicate the
clausal make-up of (3).
How many discourse segments are there in (3)? According to the
clause-criterion (3) expresses one 'idea unit' because, according to rule
(l)ii, complement clauses are considered part of their matrix constituent
(regardless of how many complement clauses are goveraed by the same
matrix). However, intuition suggests that (3) contains two segments
instead of one for it expresses the ideas that 'his wife is severely disabled'
and 'he has a family to take care of. Between these two ideas the logical
relation of addition holds (expressed by the conjunction en (and)) so that
the coherence structure is something like 'AND (segment l, segment 2)'.
Clearly, this altogether plausible segmenting is prohibited by the clause
4
 Much of the work reported here was motivated by the fact that we had to analyze
the structure of formal judicial texts. Especially the division of these texts into
discourse segments turned out to be problematic if the clause criterion was applied
in the Standard way (see Schilperoord 1996, 142ff.)·
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criterion. Consider another example, taken from the same corpus,
containing a degree clause.
(4) De situatie is echter in zoverre verschallend // dat in PLAATSNAAM
reeds voor DATUM sprake was van accu-opslag (...)
(The Situation is however to this extent different // that in PLAGE
already before DATE exists 'battery storage'.)
The Situation differs to the extent that in PLAGE battery storage had
already existed before DATE.
Since the subordinate clause dat in PLAATSNAAM reeds sprake was van
accu-opslag is neither a complement clause nor a relative clause, the
clause criterion (1) evaluates (4) äs containing two discourse Segments,
that is, the clause boundary corresponds to a boundary between two
discourse segments. This analysis implies the existence of some coherence
relation holding between the two clauses/segments. However, it's not easy
to determine the nature of this relation. For instance, one cannot simply
state this relation to be one of specification. To see the reason why,
consider again the aforementioned definition of coherence relations. It
explicitly preserves the meaning of the segments in Isolation by defming
coherence at a super segment-level. So, if the two clauses in (4) were two
segments äs well, then the following coherence relation can be deduced:
SPECIFICATION (segment b, segment a). If this analysis were correct, then
omitting segment b should only bear on the coherence relation between a
and b, but not on the meaning of segment a. Omitting segment b would
leave the meaning of segment b unspecified to be sure, but not entirely
uncomprehensible. However, deleting the subordinate clause results in a
segment that cannot be properly comprehended (and one that is in fact
plainly ungrammatical), äs is demonstrated by (4a).
(4) a ?De situatie is echter in zoverre verschillend
The comprehensibility/grammaticality of sentence (4a) can only be saved
by deleting the adverbial phrase in zoverre äs well. Actually, the tight
connection between such degree expressions and degree clauses is also
evidenced by the fact that various degree adverbs project specific
complementizers (see Jackendoff 1977:202ff.), äs testified by sentences
(5).
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(5) Hij is te dronken om te staan (He is too drunk to stand up)
Hij is rijk genoeg om een huis te kopen (He is rieh enough to buy a
house)
Hij is dusdanig groot dat dit pak hem niet past (He is so big that
Ms suit doesn 't fit him)
These observations suggest that the connection between the two clauses in
(4) is not one to be located at the discourse level. Again, however, this is
obscured by the clause-criterion.
A third example of a frequent sentence type raising segmentation problems
is (6).
(6) Te uwer informatie merk ik nog op dat client voorziet dat het niet
eenvoudig zal zijn om snel ander werk te vinden.
(For your Information remark I also that client foresees that it not
simple shall be to soon other work to find.)
For your Information I should also like to add that my dient
foresees that it will not be simple to find another Job in the short
term.
Sentence (6) presents a case of deep embedding of the clause expressing
the actual substance of the compound sentence. The clausal make-up of (6)
is presented in (7).
(7) Te uwer informatie merk ik nog op //
dat client voorziet //
dat het niet eenvoudig zal zijn //
om snel ander werk te vinden.
Verbs participating in the first two clauses express Statements of
communicative intent (opmerken, 'inform'), and of belief (voorzien,
'foresee'). Such verbs typically require a complement clause for their
conceptual completion, so here there are no problems in applying rule (1).
Things are different, however, with the deepest embedded clause Om snel
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ander werk te vinden'. As this clause seems to elaborate the adverbial
element 'niet eenvoudig' ('not simple'), rule (1) draws a segmental
boundary between the first three composite clauses and the fourth one.
Again, Intuition teils us such a decision is off the mark. Stated rather
loosely, it seems that the first two clauses express some kind of
perspective on the assertion expressed in the final clause, whereas the third
clause evaluates that assertion. To put this in more appropriate theoretical
terms, the first two clauses may be said to denote a number of connected
mental spaces of which the content is ultimately designated by the final
clause (see Fauconnier 1985, Sanders 1994). Therefore, an adequate
procedure for classification should do justice to this kind of dependency
and evaluate (6) to be one discourse segment.
We could, of course, proceed by presenting alternative types of compound
sentences raising segmentation problems. However, we believe that the
problematic cases discussed so far exemplify a more general problem with
the clause criterion - the fact that it ignores the conceplual relations that
may exist between different types of clauses. Whether or not a syntactic
clause is a discourse segment äs well crucially depends on how the
Information expressed by this clause relates conceptually to the
Information expressed by other clauses within the structure. We want to
propose a method for segmenting which is based on a notion that we will
refer to äs conceptual dependency. In brief, one clause is conceptually
dependent upon another clause, if its semantics cannot be conceptualized
without essential reference to the conceptualization of another clause. If
such an interdependency exists, we argue that the two clauses cannot enter
into a coherence relation with each other. Moreover, äs will be
demonstrated, conceptual dependency not only preserves the segmentation
decisions that follow from the original clause criterion, but additionally
accounts for the rather arbitrarily listed exceptions concerning relative
clauses and clausal complements.
3. Conceptual dependency
If defined at the proper level of abstraction, the problems encountered in
the segmentation of sentences into component clauses that correspond to
discourse segments can be solved äs soon äs we acknowledge the kind of
conceptual dependency relations Holding between clauses. This notion was
already hinted at in the former section, here we will elaborate it in more
detail. We shall do so by discussing a classic grammatical problem: the
distinction between restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses.
In Verhagen (1996), an analysis is presented of different types of
relative clauses independently of the problem of discourse segmentation,
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which will allow us to make a first move towards a better understanding of
the relationship between clause-status and segment-status. Consider
example (8).
(8) I liked the man who took that dog with bim even more than the one
who brought it in.
Here the conceptualization of (the intended referent of) the man, in this
particular sentence, can be said to be dependent on the conceptualization
of the relative clause. Without the latter Information, the conceptualization
of the object of "like even more" is incomplete. So what we can say is that
a restrictive relative clause is one that the nominal head is conceptually
dependent on. In contrast, consider the nominal head in (9):
(9) They asked the vicar, who so far has refused to state his personal
opinion, to act äs an intermediary.
In this case, the conceptualization of the object of "ask" is not dependent
on the Information in the relative clause; so we may say that a relative
clause is non-restrictive if its head is not conceptually dependent on the
contents of the clause. Verhagen therefore suggested that the interpretive
relations between both types of relative clauses and their matrix clauses
are different. Following this Suggestion, we can say the following:
A restrictive relative clause is a part of the conceptualization of a
participant in the event denoted by the matrix clause, hence an
integral part of the conceptualization of the matrix;
A non-restrictive relative clause is not an integral part of the
conceptualized event of the matrix; it has a much more 'loose'
conceptual connection to the matrix; for instance, Daalder
(1989:202) calls the function of such clauses "adverbial-like" (we
will get back to this parallel later).
Now it is only natural to say that a unit that is an integral part of the
conceptualization of a clause cannot enter into a coherence relation with
that clause on the level of discourse Interpretation. Given that it is
conceptually integrated into the higher clause, it is no longer available äs
a separate discourse segment, äs it were. Now if the essence of a
restrictive relative clause is that some part of the matrix is conceptually
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dependent on it, äs we just suggested, we may formulate the following
hypothesis on the relation between such conceptual dependency and the
possibility of a Status äs a separate discourse segment:
If a constituent of clause A is conceptually dependent on a clause
B, B is an integral pari of the conceptualization of A, and
therefore not available äs a separate discourse segment (cannot
enter into a discourse coherence relation with A, or any other part
of the discourse).
For the discourse analyst this means that a matrix element being
conceptually dependent on a subordinate clause, makes it impossible to
treat the left band boundary of the subordinate clause involved äs the
beginning of a separate discourse segment.
Now that we have formulated the idea in this general way, how does it
apply to the problematic cases that we introduced earlier? Take the
frequent type (3), repeated here äs (10).
(10) Daarbij komt dat zijn vrouw ernstig gehandicapt is en dat hij een
gezin heeft te onderhouden
In fact, the idea applies straightforwardly. The phrase Daarbij komt (dat)
in itself is necessarily incomplete; Speakers of the language can be said to
know that it is incomplete äs an element of use: for the phrase to make
sense in actual usage, it is indeed dependent on the contents of the actual
subordinate clause. So there can be no discourse segment starting at the
first occurrence of dat. However, when we have reached the end of the
first subordinate clause (...is), we have a Situation where the
conceptualization may be completed, so it is not dependent on what
follows; hence we do not only have a new clause starting here, but also a
new discourse segment. In this way, then, this string contains two
discourse Segments, which is precisely what we wanted: intuitively, there
are two coordinated additional supporting arguments to what has already
been stated before.
This is not to say that restrictive relative clauses and this type of
complements (actually: a subject clause) are similar in all respects. In one
sense, they are even in contrast: a restrictive relative does not constitute a
discourse segment, whereas the subordinate clause in (10) actually
provides the substance of the relevant discourse segment. However, this is
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completely due to the difference between the conceptual roles of the
matrix constituents that the respective clauses are subordinated to. As we
said, in restrictive relatives, this phrase denotes a participant in the event
depicted by the matrix clause. The matrix phrase (in this case the entire
matrix clause) in (10) does not even relate to the content level of the
discourse, but rather to the speech act level.3 That is, the element Daarbij
refers not to the Contents of preceding discourse, but instead to the act of
uttering this Information, argumentation, or whatever speech act the
speaker/writer performed with the previous discourse segment.
Consequently, the conceptual Contents of the syntactic main clause in (l 1)
is (at least) one level 'higher' than the contents of the preceding main
clause; graphically:
(H)
speech act level: .... Daarbij körnt dat en dat
content level: preceding zijn vrouw ernstig hij een gezin heeft te
argumentation/ gehandicapt is onderhouden
Information
By the same token, the contents of the two subordinate clauses with
Daarbij komt dat are conceptually on the same level, äs the figure
indicates, äs the main clause preceding them. In other words: If the
speech act part and the content part are distributed over a matrix and a
subordinate clause, these two parts do not constitute separate discourse
segments, but this does not make the subordinate clause less a subordinate
one (i.e. äs long äs the main clause is perceived äs such), namely
subordinated to the explicit expression of the speech act level part. Thus
we want to claim that applying these independently motivated distinctions
to the problem at hand, allows one to say at the same time that the
contents of some subordinate clauses is in fact not subordinate (i.e. at the
content level in relation to other discourse segments), and is (i.e. to the
particular speech act in which it is being produced).
Loosely speaking, our main point is that it relates to a higher level than the
content level. Perhaps we should just call it 'metalinguistic', but nothing in our
argument here hinges on the choice of terminology.
152 / JOOST SCHILPEROORD AND ARIE VERHAGEN
The Situation of a restrictive relative clause may, in contrast, be depicted
graphically äs follows:
(12) content level: I liked the man even more than the one who
took that dog with him who brought it in
Here, the fact that there are syntactic subordinate clauses does not result in
a difference of the level at which the conceptual contents is relevant, since
the heads themselves are already functional at the content level. But this
does not alter the fact that we are allowed to make the generalization
proposed above: Whenever a subordinate clause provides Information that
(part of) the matrix is conceptually dependent on, this clause does not
constitute a separate discourse segment.
Let us finally have a look at conceptual dependency relations in sentences
containing a complex consisting of a degree expression and a degree
clause. Consider (4) again, repeated here äs (13).
(13) De situatie is echter in zoverre verschillend dat in PLAATSNAAM
reeds voor DATUM sprake was van accu-opslag (...)
The structural regularities in degree clauses captured in section 2 can be
subsumed under the header of conceptual dependency. Consider the
semantics of the Deg-phrase 'in zoverre'. This phrase evokes the idea of
some kind of scale, of which the poles are defmed by the adverbial phrasal
head 'verschillend'. The scale thus ranges from 'completely identical' to
'completely different'. However, the Deg element not only evokes the
scale, it also suggests a particular point on that scale. The tight structural
connection it entertains with the degree clause can then be accounted for
conceptually if it is acknowledged that the scale itself is 'calibrated', äs it
were, by the subordinate degree clause 'dat in PLAATSNAAM...'. And
since one cannot conceptualize the scale without some means of
calibration, there exists conceptual dependency between the two clauses.
This rather complex semantic structure is captured schematically by
diagram (14).
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(14) identical
l
Deg - * - Degree clause
different
Together, the conceptualization has an argumentative stance. The
dependent clause justißes the scale point indicated by the adverb
'verschillend', but it only does so because of the designated scale itself.
The idea that a clause such äs (15):
(15) ?De situatie is in zoverre verschillend
is conceptually 'incomplete', so to speak, arises from the insertion of 'in
zoverre'. For example, it is very well possible to state:
(16) De situatie is verschillend / De situatie is anders
Hence, it can be concluded that a dependency relation holds between the
dependent clause and the element 'in zoverre'.
Returning to our main theme now, we want to suggest the following
extension of our proposal. As we have seen, a relative clause in itself
allows for a two-way interpretation: It either is restrictive, thus not a
separate discourse segment, or it is non-restrictive and has the Status of a
segment. However, other types of syntactically subordinate clauses do not
allow such a choice, but have to be taken äs either one type or another,
independently of the context. Adverbial clauses, introduced by different
kinds of conjunctions, never provide Information that some matrix part is
conceptually dependent on, thus they always constitute discourse
Segments. On the other band, the (first) complement of a predicate (both
in subject- and in object-functions), introduced by the non-specific
complementizer that, always specifies Information that the matrix is
conceptually dependent on, and thus never constitutes a discourse
segment. Then again, a second (third, etc.) complement added on to (by
means of coordination) to the first one, does not necessarily provide
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Information that the matrix is conceptually dependent upon, and thus may
be a discourse segment on its own.6
4. E-sites
In the final section we want to link our proposal to Langacker's notion of
'elaboration-sites' (e-sites) (Langacker 1987, 1991). Throughout this
paper we have been using the notion 'dependeuce' in a way that is not
Standard in general linguistic practice: Usually all syntactically
subordinate constituents are considered 'dependent', while we have
applied this notion to matrix phrases the conceptualization of which is, in
some sense, not 'complete' without the embedded information. This
actually runs parallel to Langacker's notion of conceptual dependence:
D is conceptually dependent on A to the extent that A elaborates a salient
substructure of D. (Langacker 1991:436)
In the case of relational predicates, this 'salient substructure' is a part of
the predicate's representation, called an elaboration site or e-site
(Langacker 1987:304); in non-relational predicates it is something
constructed on a more ad hoc basis; we will suggest, however, that
conceptual dependence is neutral äs to the source of the relevant
substructure.
An e-site of a particular structure is a more or \&ssßxed schematic
component of that structure which is subsequently elaborated by another
structure. An elaboration, then, involves an instantiation of an e-site
which is consistent with its schematic specification, but which is also
'more fully and precisely specified' (Langacker 1987:489). The relation
between the two structures7 can then be quasi-formalized äs in (17) in
which the subscript De denotes the e-site of D.
(17) D (De A )
Although Langacker did not envisage the types of phrases and relations
that we are concerned with, and, more specifically, although his proposal
6
 Note that we are only concerned here with the determination of segment-status,
not with the place of a segment in the (hierarchical) text structure.
7
 Compare Langacker's treatment of valence relations (1987, 277ff.).
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did not involve the problem of discourse segmentation, it is not difficult to
extend it to those areas.
The characteristic function of complement clauses is precisely to
elaborate a salient substructure of the main clause: the e-site of the main
verb, i.e. a relational predicate. These substructures can be assumed to be
'salient' äs they refer to prominent participants in the event denoted by the
main clause. In terms of (17), these interrelations can be stated äs follows
(18).
(18) (...V (Ve—)comp.ci.··Omain cl.
Because complement clauses elaborate the e-site of the main clause verb,
their conceptualizations are an integral part of the conceptualization of the
main clause. Without these, the conceptualization of the main clause
would be necessarily incomplete, which is the reason why in these cases
main clauses are conceptually dependent upon subordinate clauses. It then
follows from Sanders' (1992) defmition of coherence relations that
complement clauses cannot enter into a discourse relation with the main
clause. After all, this defmition presupposes the possibility of independent
conceptualizations of the clauses/segments between which a coherence
relation holds.
The difference between these types of clauses and restrictive relatives can
be described, in a way we will now explain, in terms of a difference of
entrenchment of the relationship between main clause elements and their
respective e-sites. Typically, illocutionary verbs, verbs of belief and the
argumentative use of the verb 'körnen' in formal Dutch prose are strongly
associated with a schematic e-site. One may say that structures such äs
V (Ve~)co are Part °f me speaker's knowledge of his language, or his
Mental Grammar: knowing a verb such äs note or propose, or a typical
fixed phrase such äs Daarbij körnt (cf. "It should be added"), simply
involves knowing that it requires complementation in one way or another
äs well. Thus the salience of these substructures (e-sites) is a matter of
memory, not dependent on particular conditions of use.
In the case of nominals, which are not even relational predicates
to begin with, things are different. What we have to be crucially aware of
here is that when put to use, nominals are not so much used to evoke the
concepts associated with them in memory, but to evoke, via these concepts
so to speak, the conceptualization of a particular ('grounded') instance of
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that concept.8 From a communicative point of view, it is thus pivotal that
a Speaker allows bis interlocutor to establish 'mental contact' with that
particular instance of a concept. In other words, the Speaker must provide
bis interlocutor with means to get access to the intended noun referent (cf.
Langacker 1990:321). The notion of accessibility of noun phrase referents
is now well entrenched in the cognitive linguistic literature (see especially
Ariel 1988, 1990). Languages contain rieh Systems of linguistic means to
make intended nominal referents accessible for listeners, and to signal the
current accessibility Status of a nominal referent. For example,
(unstressed) pronouns, or zero-anaphors ('handle with care') signal high
accessibility of the nominal referent, whereas full-fledged NP's containing
adjuncts usually signal low accessibility. In addition, determiners and
quantifiers are used to code accessibility: The instantiation of a new
referent within a discourse is typically established by using indefinite
articles.
What we want to propose here is that restrictive relative clauses
can be treated äs a way for the Speaker to signal the level of accessibility
of a nominal referent. They literally restrict the selection of instances from
a set denoted by a concept. That is, a restrictive relative clause does not
elaborate an e-site that is given by linguistic knowledge, but it does
elaborate a conceptual substructure of the intended nominal
conceptualization. One might suggest that elaborating a conceptual
substructure of an intended nominal conceptualization is thus conceptually
parallel to the elaboration of an e-site of a relational predicate - only here
it is one that is situationally evoked, determined by the accessibility of the
intended discourse referent. Arguably, if the intended referent of a noun is
relatively new in a discourse, or if it has to be reestablished, or if it is to
be distinguished from referents competing for attention with the intended
one, the function of restrictive relative clauses may be one of identifying
its referential domain. In such cases the relative clause indeed does
elaborate a situationally evoked salient substructure of the intended
conceptualization of the main clause. This Situation contrasts with the one
where a noun is accompanied by a nonrestrictive relative clause. Consider
the sentences in (20):
(20) a. I liked the man who took that dog with him,....
b. I liked the man, who took that dog with him,....
In principle, the distinction is relevant in the case of verbs äs well, but it is not so
crucial for the sense of conceptual dependence that we are concerned with here.
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Langacker (1991:431) argues that the head noun elaborates a salient
participant of the relative clause, and in that sense one might say that the
relative clause is dependent on its head noun; this holds for both (20)a and
b, äs the trajector of the relative clause in each is only schematically
indicated by the relative pronoun, indicating a participant elaborated äs the
man in the matrix clause. However, in sentence (20)a there is an
additional dependency in that the denoted referent of the head noun is
made accessible by the relative clause (see also Deane 1992:105, who
describes this dependency in terms of 'referential dependency'). In other
words, it is only by virtue of the Information provided in the restrictive
relative clause, that the intended referent of the noun-phrase can be
established, or made accessible. It is in that sense, therefore, that we
propose that the conceptualization of the noun phrase is dependent upon
the restrictive relative clause. Once again, without the restrictive relative
clause, the conceptualization of the head-noun by itself does not suffice.
For that reason, the restrictive relative clause cannot be regarded äs a
distinct discourse Segments. In (20)b, on the other band, the relative
clause only serves to modify, and not to identijy the intended
conceptualization of the noun phrase; in that case, the head noun does
suffice for identification, and therefore the conceptualization is not
dependent upon the relative clause. For that reason, non-restrictive
relatives are distinct discourse segments that enter into a coherence
relation with the main clause (a relation that can be, for instance,
'specification' or 'modification', and sometimes even concession; cf.
Daalder 1989).
The difference between, on the one band mental state verbs or
illocutionary verbs, which contain an e-site to be elaborated by a
complement clause, and nouns on the other, is thus a matter of degree of
fixedness. Whereas the verbs mentioned here typically contain fixed
e-sites of the structure V (Ve")cc> tne strength of the connection between a
nominal concept and the elaboration of a substructure of that concept is
much more loose, and dependent upon the current discourse Situation.
Once the referent of a noun phrase is established properly, the need to
identify that referent vanishes, at least for some time during discourse
processing. That is, if nouns refer to concepts already given, or inferrable
from the previous discourse, relative clauses cannot be considered to
elaborate a substructure of the nominal concept (and are therefore non-
restrictive).
Now, let us have a look at clause complexes containing connecting
elements, such äs because or while. Such connectors are prototypical
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means for indicating relations between clauses on the discourse level. In
Langacker's view, they even go so far äs to proßle the interclausal
relationship (ibid, 426). While, for instance, results in temporal inclusion
of the events denoted by two clauses. As this typically requires the
contents of these clauses to be conceptualized independently, while defines
clausal connections on the discourse level, which is perfectly in line with
the definition of coherence relations. In Langacker's analysis, while
contains two e-sites, called the trajector and the landmark respectively,
which are elaborated by the two connected clauses (i.e. the main clause
and the subordinate clause). It follows that a subordinate clause elaborates
the e-site of a clause connector C, not of a clause participant, which is the
very reason to consider these (adverbial) clauses äs discourse segments.
This is schematized in (21).
(21) C((Cel..)cl)(Ce2..)c2)
The independent nature of the clauses l and 2 is accounted for by not
letting one clause depend on the other one, whereas the autonomous Status
of the connector C is accounted for by not letting it participate within one
of the connected clauses. In a sentence such äs (22) (taken from Langacker
1991), the contents of the clauses can be conceptualized independently,
but their respective contents are modified by 'placing' them together in
some specific context.
(22) While ((she was working in the garden)(Janet found a lizard))
Rather then going into the details with respect to the impact the contents
of these clauses have upon each other (see Langacker 1991:425), we
maintain that, generally speaking, these effects result from a specific
discourse relation which is imposed, so to speak, on the structure äs a
whole. We emphasize this point because an adverbial clause might have
the effect of conceptually modifying the contents of a main clause (which,
then, would be a type of conceptual dependency). Therefore we conclude
this paper by discussing examples such äs (23), taken from Pander Maat
(1994).
(23) Je werkt tot de bei gaat (You work till the bell goes, You must work
till the bell rings)
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Pander Maat argues that (23) expresses one discourse segment, and not
two äs we would say, because the subordinate clause has the effect of
restricting the meaning of the main clause (cf. Pander Maat 1994:33, see
also Haliday 1987). Sentences such äs (23) thus seem to run counter to the
distinctions made here. So how are we deal with it?
We think we simply have to be explicit about the possible relations
between conceptual (in)dependency of syntactically subordinate clauses
and the elements introducing these clauses (phrases introducing the
relevant clauses and the words in the 'complementizer'-position). In
principle, we have three logically possible kinds of relations:
a) if a clause C is introduced by element X, the matrix is always
conceptually dependent on C (X marks C and its matrix äs
conceptually dependent);
b) if a clause C is introduced by element X, the matrix is never
conceptually dependent on C (X marks C and its matrix äs
conceptually independent);
c) the matrix of a clause C introduced by X sometimes is
conceptually dependent on C, and sometimes it is not (X in itself
does not mark C and its matrix äs conceptually dependent or
independent).
Relative clauses are clearly of type c): the 'simple' fact that a clause is
introduced by a relative pronoun is in itself insufficient to decide whether
the head noun is conceptually dependent on the clause, or if the clause
constitutes a separate discourse unit. In such cases, conceptual
(in)dependency is purely a matter of the meaning of the entire structure.
The cases that constituted the problem that we started out with are
of type a): Whenever we have a phrase like Daar körnt bij dat, we know
this to be conceptually dependent on the clause following it, so that the
latter is not a separate discourse unit. In fact, we would ultimately like to
explore the possibility that the conjunction dat ('that'), the marking
typical of complement clauses, functions precisely äs a lexical
manifestation of a relation of conceptual dependency between clauses.
Adverbial clauses like (20), introduced by conjunctions such äs
omdat ('because'), terwijl ('while'), etcetera, are of type b): Whenever we
encounter because, while, etc., we know that the clauses surrounding or
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following it are separate discourse units, and that its matrix is not
conceptually dependent on these clauses.9
We would like to suggest now that a subordinate clause
introduced by the preposition tot is of type c), just like a relative clause:
being introduced by tot (like being introduced by a relative pronoun) is in
itself a strict marking neither for conceptual dependency, nor for
independence. In (21), the meaning of the entire structure apparently
imposes a relation of conceptual dependency (the subordinate clause is
taken äs a restrictive modifier, in this case of the predicate), at least äs a
kind of default. Such relations in fact parallel the use of tot äs a
straightforward preposition with a nominal complement, äs in Je werkt tot
zes uur, 'You will work till six o'clock'. In other cases, however, tot
introduces a non-restrictive clause; an example is (24):
(24) Jan heeft aan het slothoofdstuk van zijn dissertatie zitten werken,
tot(dat) de bei het diner aankondigde.
(John has on the final-chapter of bis dissertation been working,
until (that) the bell the dinner) announced
John has been working on the final chapter ofhis dissertation, until
the bell announced dinner.
It may be the case that in such cases the more elaborate alternative totdat
('compound' of tot and the subordinating conjunction) is in fact preferred
over the simple tot - something that would be expected from the point of
view of iconicity. However, intuitions are subtle in this area, and we have
not yet undertaken a further investigation of this Suggestion. Be this äs it
may, one can in principle 'force' a non-restrictive Interpretation on the tot-
clause in (23) (indicated in writing by punctuation), without tot becoming
impossible - indicating that tot in itself is compatible with both types of
interpretations. In any case, this would mean that there is a class of
Note that this idea, if correct, might provide a basis for explaining the Intuition
thatiteis semantically more 'empty' than other subordinating conjunctions. That is,
we would still maintain that dat has a meaning, i.e. has a cognitive function to fulfill,
but that its specific function is purely 'relational': an Operation on the relation
between the conceptual contents of two clauses (dependency), whereas because,
although, etc. primarily denote a relation of a certain kind (causal, concessive, etc.),
and äs a consequence also indicate a relational Operation (in this case: of conceptual
independence). We hope to explore these ideas further in later work.
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expressions introducing subordinate clauses, which does not determine the
profile elaborated by the clause (specifically: dat), so that such a clause is
always conceptually integrated into its matrix. On the other band, there is
a class of expressions which does determine the subordinate clause's
profile; such clauses may or may not be conceptually integrated: certain
elements necessarily mark their clauses äs separate discourse units, while
others (like tot) are indeterminate in this respect.
Our point of departure in this paper was Mann and Thompson's conviction
that semantic factors should not interfere with the division of discourse
into discourse units. We have attempted to argue that their formal criterion
does not always arrive at a proper segmentation. Also, we have argued
that problematic cases for a formal criterion always, in one way or
another, involve conceptual dependency of clauses. By doing so, we have
offered a semantic account for the list of exceptions on the formal clause
criterion mentioned by Mann and Thompson. Restrictive relative clauses,
and complement clauses cannot be distinct segments because they elaborate
a salient substructure within their matrix. In addition, the notion of
conceptual dependency has been extended to other types of clause-
complexes, notably complexes involving degree-clauses. To conclude,
although in its present form our proposal applies to a restricted set of
'problematic' clausal complexes, we claim that its implication exceeds this
domain. Needless to say, however, more research will be necessary in
order to arrive at a conceptually based, sound criterion for segmenting
discourse. We maintain, however, to have made a case for such a
conceptual approach to this problem by demonstrating that applying
insights from cognitive linguistics is crucial to the very basis of discourse
analysis: the identification of relevant discourse units.
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